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1. Introduction 
Both the financial and economic, and the migration, crises show how important it is that 
the European Union (EU) is able to aggregate different views of the appropriate policy 
solution. These views emerge at all levels of the multi-level EU polity. They are 
expressed or harboured by citizens, mainstream pro-EU parties and their Eurosceptic 
challengers. Views on what should or should not be done at the EU level circulate in the 
local, regional, national and, indeed, transnational and supranational domains of politics. 
Not all of these expressions coincide or ultimately feature in what is decided at the EU-
level, but the importance of understanding what different political actors want from 
Europe matters for explaining how the EU arrives at its decisions is difficult to contest. 
For these reasons, scholars of the EU have long been interested in what matters for 
political actors and how they arrive at what in the field is thought of as their 
‘preferences’ in EU decision-making. Assigned a central role in the liberal 
intergovernmentalist framework elaborated by Andrew Moravscik in the early 1990s, 
‘preferences’ and ‘preference formation’ have become an important part of the 
conceptual toolkit for investigating EU decision-making. Despite the criticisms that 
liberal intergovernmentalism has attracted since its emergence, these two concepts 
have retained their attraction as they link EU decisions to the range of positions taken by 
member governments.  
 
At the same time, even scholars who are critical of how liberal intergovermentalism 
theorises the process of preference formation and how it conceptualises preferences, 
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and especially of how liberal intergovernmentalism distinguishes the notion of 
preferences from positions, use the very same terminology in their accounts (cf. Schirm 
2018). In other words, although the value of ‘preferences’ and ‘preference formation’ as 
concepts is widely recognised, there is often hesitation and sometimes deep anxiety, 
about how they are defined and deployed within the liberal intergovernmentalist 
framework. Both the attraction of the terminology, as well as dissatisfaction with its 
application by liberal intergovernmentalism, are strongly represented in accounts of 
responses to the financial and economic crisis and attempts to explain the reform of the  
euro zone. As Csehi and Puetter (2017) have shown in their examination of accounts of 
the euro zone crisis, scholars may utilise ‘preferences’ and ‘preference formation’ as 
organizing concepts, but depart from liberal intergovernmentalism. Moreover, even 
some of the latter’s most stalwart proponents find it hard to adhere strictly to the 
understandings and framework as originally outlined by Moravcsik.  
 
This dissonance is the starting point for this special issue. The purpose of this 
introduction and the articles that follow is to reflect critically on the usefulness of 
‘preferences’ and ‘preference formation’ for understanding how views are aggregated by 
actors in EU decision-making. Rather than using the definitions offered by liberal 
intergovernmentalism as a starting point, this introduction undertakes a broader review 
of how preference formation has been conceptualised and theorised in EU studies and 
neighbouring sub-disciplines of political science. Taking this wider view makes it 
possible to address themes or pose questions that often go unaddressed when 
discussion is limited to an evaluation of the liberal intergovernmentalist framework. 
Indeed, we argue that problematizing preference formation is essential for new research 
on the euro crisis, and beyond. 
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Although often equated with governmental or even state preference formation, 
preference formation is arguably a wider political process in which many social actors 
potentially engage often in different ways. In this spirit, Hall defines preference 
formation as a political process ‘by which social actors decide what they want and what 
to pursue’ (Hall 2005, 129). Preferences of individual actors may be considered at an 
aggregate level but this requires us to conceptualize processes of aggregation. 
Governmental preference formation is of key interest to students of EU politics who 
study decision-making between member state governments but the concept as such 
does not reveal itself in terms of how such preferences are formed or whether they can 
be identified in expressions of governmental action and communication.  
 
Liberating ‘preferences’ and ‘preference formation’ from its moorings in (or 
appropriation by) liberal intergovernmentalism makes it possible to address a broader 
series of questions when analysing state preference formation in the EU: At which level 
does preference formation take place? Does it include local, regional, national, 
transnational, supranational and even global constituencies? If so, to what extent, and to 
what degree are these levels intertwined? Does preference formation also occur through 
policy transfer? Learning? International constraints? Does framing influence political 
preference formation? And, finally, how do feedback loops and the empowering (and 
disempowering) of certain actor groups influence preference formation in the EU?  
 
The contributions in this special issue address these issues through empirical studies of 
how specific member state governments formed and defended preferences on the 
reform of economic governance mechanisms during the euro crisis. This introduction 
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provides contextualisation and points of reference for the discussions that follow. The 
next section provides a brief review of key theoretical approaches to preference 
formation, focusing in particular on ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalism, as well as liberal and 
the new intergovernmentalism. The following section introduces the contributions to 
this special issue and relates some of their key findings to these conceptual insights. 
Finally, we offer some brief conclusions on what can be learned from these in-depth case 
studies for research and conceptualisations of preferences and preference formation of 
economic governance and more generally. 
 
 
2. Theoretical approaches to preference formation  
 The notions of ‘preference’ and ‘preference formation’ are central aspects of politics. 
How and why actors establish what they want and how they pursue these preferences in 
relation to others is crucial in understanding how political and social systems function. 
Sub-disciplines of political science, including international relations, political economy 
and public policy, address the issue from different and diverse epistemological 
perspectives.  
 
Preference formation in rational choice approaches 
Rationalist approaches in international relations and foreign policy-making tend to label 
state preferences ‘interests’ and consider them fixed. In this view, political outcomes 
result from the material interests of the relevant actors defined more or less direct in 
terms of the economic benefits that will ensue from cooperation (Frieden and Rogowski 
1998; Rogowski 1989). The main value of this approach is that it highlights the material 
interests that underpin many political outcomes. As with other conceptual frameworks, 
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rational choice approaches are not uniform. In the literature on foreign economic policy-
making, while some scholars within the tradition argue that national preferences reflect 
the country’s major economic interests (Rogowski 1989 ; Frieden 1991; Moravcsik 
1993, 1998, 2011; Aspinwall 2007), others emphasise the policy preferences of central 
decision-makers (cf. e.g. Krasner 1978; Gilpin 1981). Realism goes further and claims 
that state preferences may not reflect domestic preferences at all. It sees the state as an 
autonomous actor, which often pursues an independent goal of promoting the general 
well-being of the society as a whole. 
 
Situated in EU studies, but with the explicit aspiration for recognition as a paradigmatic 
alternative to realism and institutionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism contests this 
view and argues that state preferences are not fixed. In this approach, state preferences 
are derived from domestic social pressures. They are rooted fundamentally in state-
society relations (Moravcsik 1993, 1998, 2011, 2018; Schirm 2018). National 
preferences, according to Moravcsik (1998: 24) are an ‘ordered and weighted set of 
values placed on future substantive outcomes’, which are driven by geopolitical and 
economic interests in relation to European integration. Preferences are ‘not simply a 
particular set of policy goals but a set of underlying national objectives independent of 
any particular international negotiation’ (Moravcsik 1998: 20). 
 
This definition is important in at least two ways. First, it asserts that preference 
formation is a domestic process that is independent of, and precedes interaction at the 
EU level, and thus implies a temporal sequencing. Second, the definition allows for an 
analytical differentiation between ‘preference formation’ and what is labelled as 
‘position-taking’ (see also Degner and Leuffen 2017: 3). The latter occurs during 
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intergovernmental exchanges and may be the result of compromises, side-payments, or 
the formation of alternative coalitions (Moravcsik 1998: 64-66). It is assumed by liberal 
intergovernmentalism that preferences tend to be enduring. This allows for cases where 
preferences and government positions differ. The analytical distinction is rooted in the 
conviction that domestic preference formation is more fundamental than, and prior to, 
position-taking (Kim 2016, also Schimmelfennig 2014, 2015). 
 
Political economy motivations influence the process of preference formation over 
geopolitical interest or ideology. According to liberal intergovernmentalism, national 
decision-makers, elites and economic interest groups are central to national preference 
formation. Simply put, Moravcsik (1993) argues that international cooperation creates 
domestic winners and losers amongst societal groups. In situations where costs are 
diffuse but gains concentrated, the beneficiaries of integration face fewer obstacles than 
integration losers. This makes it harder for political actors to ignore their demands. If 
costs are concentrated, but benefits diffuse, the opposite is the case and the losers from 
integration will be heard. The ambiguity of public opinion, however, in particular at 
times when policy issues become linked to questions of identity, makes it more difficult 
for liberal intergovernmentalism to explain how citizens and societal interests influence 
national preferences (Kleine and Pollack, 2018; Hooghe and Marks, 2018; cf. for 
response Moravcsik 2018: 1660).  
 
While approaches, such as post-functionalism, functionalism, multilevel governance or 
constructivism address different aspects of these questions, including identity issues 
among the population and its influence on European negotiations, or the influence of 
domestic values and ideas, institutionalist approaches combine multiple elements. 
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According to one well-known definition, institutions are ‘formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and the economy’ (Hall 1986: 19).  From 
another perspective within the institutionalist camp, by contrast, 'taken-for-
granted scripts, rules, and classifications are the stuff of which institutions are made' 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 15). 
While intergovernmentalism in its broadest sense understands actors defining state 
preferences in particular as political elites, experts, economic interest groups and even 
parties, institutionalists define these domestic variables in a much broader sense. In an 
older tradition, the institutions in question refer to the formal legal structure of political 
systems, particularly the ‘public laws that concern formal governmental organizations’ 
(Eckstein 1979: 2), as well ‘the ideas embedded in them’ (see Rhodes 2011: 142, 145). In 
this approach, practised by among others Duverger, Finer, and Eckstein, ‘legal rules and 
procedures are the basic independent variable and the functioning and fate of 
democracies the dependent variable’ (Rhodes 2011: 145). Moreover, these ‘rules are 
prescriptions; that is, behavior occurs because of a particular rule. For example, local 
authorities limit local spending and taxes because they know the central government . . . 
can impose a legal ceiling or even directly run the local authority’ (Rhodes 2011:145). 
The old institutionalism, furthermore, is comparative, historical and inductive (Rhodes 
2011: 146). 
 
While the old institutionalism focuses on formal institutions and their interaction in 
political systems, the new institutionalism adopts a different understanding of 
‘institutions’ and features an alternative research agenda. Whether or not the new 
institutionalism in its main variants is interpreted as a reaction to behaviourialism 
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(March and Olsen 1984; Hall and Taylor 1996; Adcock et al 2006), its exponents criticise 
‘old institutionalism’ as ‘atheoretical’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2). Though the 
different new institutionalisms adopt quite different methodological approaches, they 
share what Rhodes (2011: 144) describes as a ‘modernist-empiricist epistemology’, 
where ‘institutions such as legislatures, constitutions, and civil services are treated as 
discrete objects that can be compared, measured, and classified’. 
 
The differences between old and new institutionalisms matter for the understanding of 
preferences and preference formation. For the older tradition, an examination of the 
respective powers and responsibilities of political institutions would be the starting 
point for understanding national preferences or positions.  Variants of the new 
institutionalism, however, would take a quite different approach. Whereas rational 
choice institutionalism assumes as given individual preferences for optimising material 
advantage and holds that self-interest can explain the selection, persistence and decline 
of particular institutions, historical, sociological, as well as discursive, institutionalisms, 
believe that preferences are socially constructed and assume that preferences are 
suggestible or open to change (Hall 1993, Berman 1998, Blyth 2002; Schmidt 2013; 
Carstensen and Schmidt 2015). Preferences are based not only on expected or feared 
consequences, but also on what actors perceive as appropriate (March and Olsen 1989, 
Finnemore 1993).  Actor-centred constructivism as a variant of institutionalism 
attempts to reconcile the foregoing, arguing that, while actors are indeed economically-
oriented rational beings, they are embedded in institutions that indicate appropriate 
behaviour and hence establish boundaries in which individuals or groups act. Crossing 
these boundaries is possible, but it incurs a cost (Jabko 2006; Saurugger 2013). The 
implications for preference formation in the context of the EU as a multi-level system 
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are significant. It follows that the preferences, which are presented and defended by 
member governments at the EU level, are shaped in some part by EU institutional 
norms. This notion is essentially an insight from the new institutionalism.   
 
New intergovernmentalism (Bickerton et al. 2015; Puetter 2014) is embedded in the 
broader institutionalist literature, and anchors this idea within an intergovernmentalist 
setting of EU decision-making. As a more recent theoretical framework, it addresses the 
notion of preference formation in two important ways. While new 
intergovernmentalism is compatible with the institutionalist notion of preference 
formation as an embedded process, it highlights a particular pattern of EU-level 
decision-making, which has been consolidated throughout the post-Maastricht period. 
Member states remain reluctant to empower supranational institutions, notably the 
Commission, along the lines of the classic community method. Instead, they prefer to 
pursue further integration by putting themselves in the driving seat. Rather than 
empowering traditional supranational actors, member governments use collective 
forums, or institutions, such as the European Council and the Eurogroup, to take 
important executive decisions themselves, including bailouts or prescriptions to correct 
domestic economic policy. The absence of legislative decision-making leaves unanimity 
among member governments as the only viable decision-making rule. In this context 
consensus-seeking has become the guiding norm in EU intergovernmental politics. This 
is detectable through highly institutionalized forms of policy deliberation among 
executive actors, which have a monopoly in exercising all key policy functions 
simultaneously: policy formulation, adoption and implementation. It is the institutional 
environment of the European Council and the Council that aligns member state 
administrations including senior bureaucrats and political decision-makers in a 
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transnational policy-making environment (Puetter 2014). For the new 
intergovernmentalism preference formation becomes an inherently transnational 
process that involves governmental elites. The administrative underpinnings of this 
deliberative intergovernmentalism (Puetter 2012) contradict the assertion that 
preferences are forged in a domestic setting before they are advanced at the EU level 
and implies an amalgamation of both. Moreover, the new intergovernmentalism 
assumes that frictions in representative democracy and changes to the role of specific 
societal actors, such as trade union and organized business, are key sources of the 
relative autonomy of member state governments in determining their own preferences 
on EU integration. Although this autonomy comes with the caveat that governments 
constantly worry about their legitimation, governments are able to make standalone 
inputs in EU politics (Bickerton et al. 2015: 714). 
 
However, new institutionalist thinking might also open up further understandings of the 
domestic sphere, notably of the wide range of domestic factors that potentially influence 
preference formation. Although front and centre in discussion of the national 
coordination of EU policy (Kassim et al 2000, 2001), domestic institutions rarely feature 
in explanations of preference formation in their own right. The respective roles played 
by governments and legislatures, by national and sub-national authorities, and by 
central banks, are not only likely to be relevant to how a state positions itself in EU 
discussions, but are a key variable in accounting for cross-national differences. In this 
context, also the old institutionalism, for example, may in the absence of a convincing 
account of interest mobilisation, interest aggregation, or a theory of the state on part of 
liberal intergovernmentalism (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2004), provide insights into 
how governmental institutions within the domestic setting arrive at a decision on what 
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position should be presented and defended at the EU level.  
 
More broadly, conceiving the EU is as a multi-level system rather than a forum for hard 
bargaining between governments opens up the possibility that pressure for what counts 
as ‘appropriate behaviour’ may derive from a wide range of sources. They include 
domestic groups, veto players or public opinion at home, and transnational institutions, 
interest groups such as European associations, and European think tanks, and other 
governments, or even public opinion in other member states as horizontal factors within 
the EU setting. Expertise, ideology, and technical knowledge may also be important. In 
this context, Kathleen McNamara’s research has shown that fundamental developments 
in economic theory played a key role in shifting the preferences of EU member states 
towards EMU (McNamara 1998). Paradigms or appropriate behaviour can be 
understood as beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships, which are central in 
establishing fundamental preferences over specific courses of action: ‘Causal beliefs are 
rooted in theories about how the world works, but the credibility of those theories turns 
on our experience of using them. As experience shifts, so do our causal beliefs’ (Hall 
2005, 152; Hall 2012). 
3. Studying preference formation in the context of the euro crisis 
Separating preferences and preference formation from liberal intergovernmentalism 
allows a far greater range of actors, influences and pressures to be taken into account 
when considering how and why member governments adopted their respective 
positions during the Euro crisis. In the above discussion we developed three important 
notions of preferences and preference formation, which we consider crucial in order to 
enrich the use and understanding of these concepts. First, we understand preference 
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formation as a transnational process, as argued by new intergovernmentalism. Second, 
we consider preference formation as influenced by the domestic institutional context, 
considering both new and old institutionalism. Third and finally, we investigate in how 
far preference formation is based on appropriate behaviour understood in the broadest 
possible way according to new institutionalist thinking.  
 
This special issue features four empirical studies. Fontan and Saurugger (2019) examine 
preference formation during the euro crisis in France, Kassim et al (2019) look at how 
preferences were formed in the United Kingdom, the largest non-euro zone EU member 
state, and Degner and Leuffen (2019) provide an in-depth analysis of preference 
formation in Germany, the largest euro zone member state. Taking a transnational 
approach, Bojovic et al (2019) study the role of socio-economic interest groups and 
other non-executive actors in preference formation in nine euro zone countries in 
relation to the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The contributions 
critically examine with varying emphasis whether or not national governments were 
insulated from or exposed to domestic politics, transnational processes, and behavioural 
norms as they formed their preferences on crisis-induced EMU reform. 
 
The two case studies on the United Kingdom and France show that preference formation 
with regard to the adoption of new EMU governance instruments was indeed a 
transnational process, as much as one which was based on domestic institutional 
factors. In the UK’s case, in three of the four instances under scrutiny - the initial bailout 
of Greece, the capitalisation of the ESM, the legal nature of the debt brake enshrined in 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) and the introduction of so-
called reverse qualified majority voting – government preferences were determined by a 
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small circle of top politicians in the absence of significant mobilisation, or even interest 
on the part of relevant societal groups.  
 
The main constraints on HMG were imposed by Parliament and intra-party opposition 
(Kassim et al 2019).  These variables, which are at the core of the ‘old institutionalism’, 
are absent from liberal intergovernmentalism. In the latter’s pared-down conception of 
the domestic arena, which reflects the flawed premises of classic pluralism, the only 
actors are societal interests and the state executive. Such a limited conceptualisation of 
the domestic setting does not capture the factors that in particular the case of the United 
Kingdom has shown to be important, nor does it provide a basis for explaining cross-
national differences.  
 
Similarly, the French case study shows that economic governance was dominated by a 
small number of civil servants and representatives from the banking industry who 
formed a strong and tight policy network. The authors show that the convergence of 
preferences between the French government and French banks fostered the emergence 
of “economic patriotism” within a “post-dirigiste” state (Clift and Woll 2012). However, 
contrary to the UK case, the formation of French preferences was also influenced by the 
euro zone’s institutional structure and power considerations even before member states 
started the intergovernmental bargaining process (Fontan and Saurugger 2019). On the 
one hand, Germany’s economic power and legal organisation nudged French negotiators 
to internalise German’s red lines when developing their own policy preferences. On the 
other hand, the iterative nested games that characterise euro zone macroeconomic 
policies were a window of opportunity for French negotiators to further their interests 
and protect their own red lines. Contrary to the case study on Germany, however, 
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domestic politics and electoral outcomes did not affect the formation of French 
preferences.  
 
With regard to the German case, and drawing on the responsiveness literature, Degner 
and Leuffen (2019) challenge the claim that well-organised business interests determine 
governmental preferences in times of crisis. They argue, rather, that vote-seeking 
governments accounted for citizens’ policy demands, given particularly high levels of 
saliency and public attention prevalent during crises. Based on original data from the 
‘EMU Choices’ project, public opinion polls as well as newspaper articles, the authors 
trace the development of the German government’s positioning on reforms, such as the 
creation of the ESM or the tightening of fiscal governance rules. They show that the 
German government, despite intensive lobbying efforts by banks and industry 
associations, were more responsive to the demands of the public. This leads the authors 
to conclude that input legitimacy in EU decision-making is stronger than often assumed, 
at least at the level of governmental preference formation in times of crises.  
 
The fourth contribution investigates the influence of important socio-economic actors, 
including representatives of organised business and labour, as well as parliamentarians, 
in determining governmental preferences on the creation of the ESM during the euro 
crisis in nine  euro zone countries. The country sample includes three debtor countries, 
(Spain, Portugal, and Ireland), four creditor countries, (Austria, the Netherlands, 
Finland, and Estonia), one small economy with a vulnerable banking sector (Slovenia), 
and Slovakia, a member state which had seen its government collapse on the issue of the 
ESM’s predecessor, the European Financial Stability Facility. Bojovic et al (2019) suggest 
that in all these countries governments had significant leeway in forming their 
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preferences on the ESM and were driven predominantly by internal technocratic advice 
and their integration into EU-level structures of bureaucratic cooperation -- findings 
that match the case studies on France and the United Kingdom. Moreover, Bojovic et al 
(2019) show that initial governmental preferences were not challenged by important 
interest groups and that in those instances where parliamentary actors asserted 
themselves, the concessions they received did not affect the original principles of ESM 
design.   
 
Collectively, these articles show that research on preference formation requires 
attention to what we refer to as the horizontal or even circular dimension of preference 
formation. Instead of conceiving preference formation as a process which centres only 
on the domestic sphere and particular actor groups, research must take seriously the 
formation of preferences on EU policy by different political actors interacting in 
different ways at different levels of the EU’s multi-level polity. As Marks, Hooghe and 
Blank (1996) reminded us more than two decades ago, member state governments 
represent only one category of political actors among many others, even if they are the 
most powerful.  
Moreover, researchers need to recognise the problems in preference formation. While 
research on EU governance distinguishes between input, output and throughput 
legitimacy (Schmidt 2013), it has not yet explored or defined a category for instances in 
which political actors form no particular preference. Moreover, broader scepticism 
towards or approval of EU integration in itself does not amount to a clearly articulated 
preference for a particular policy option. However, such beliefs may feature in the 
formation of preferences on the part of some actors, as the new intergovernmentalism 
proposes (Hodson and Puetter 2019). 
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The importance of process-tracing and the avoidance of broad generalizations about 
patterns of preference aggregation, in particular in relation to societal processes, 
emerge as strong messages from the contributions to this special issue in regard to the 
future research agenda on preference formation. Policy approaches that highlight 
feedback loops hold particular promise in this regard. In order to make decisions, 
humans and organizations rely on information from often complex environments 
(Simon 1997, 1985; Jones 2001). In order to define a policy preference, or, in policy 
language, a solution to a problem, political actors must identify the important attributes 
of a problem and match these attributes to the available solutions. 
 
Although an issue of a public policy is often multidimensional, attention to the subject is  
usually unidirectional (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Hence, it is complicated for an 
actor to pay simultaneously attention to multiple dimensions of a problem. However, 
focusing events, or windows of opportunity, can serve as a trigger for policy change 
(Birkland 1997, Kingdon 1984). The euro crisis provided such a window of opportunity 
(cf. amongst others Degner 2018). Focusing events or windows of opportunity make a 
new dimension of an issue more salient, leading an increasing number of actors to be 
willing to change course. In framing the issue, the media, public perception and political 
symbols are crucial factors to influence actors’ preferences, and this beyond the simple 
economic interests that prevail (Stone 1989, Hall 1993).  
 
Rochefort and Cobb (1994) argue in this respect that ‘cultural values, interest group 
advocacy, scientific information and professional advice all help to shape the content of 
problem definition’, and from there, we would argue, preference formation. The EU’s 
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multilevel character adds further, but necessary, complexity to this understanding of 
preference formation. First, if national preference formation is not only the result of the 
influence of major economic interest groups and political elites at the domestic level but 
also of media and public perceptions, these perceptions and media are not domestically 
embedded but go beyond borders. Second, preference formation, as depicted by public 
policy approaches, is more complex than a series of linear push factors. It is a circular 
process through which political elites and experts, interest groups and social 
movements, as well as the media, contribute to the framing of a problem and influence 
state actors in shaping national preferences. Decisions taken on the basis of preferences 
at the EU level then once again influence domestic actors who adjust and adapt their 
positions, and ultimately transform national preferences.  
 
Contributions to this special issue thus engage in tracing domestic as well as EU-level 
processes of preference formation and consider the interlinkages between different 
societal actors. A key element of research will be a focus on structuring elements of 
preference formation. The degree of formal or informal institutionalization of, for 
example, relations between transnational elites can be a key indicator for interlinked 
processes of preference formation. In a similar vein, societal processes such as the 
decline of the model of tripartite macroeconomic governance, which accompanies the 
evolution of EMU’s institutional framework despite (failed) attempts of its 
institutionalization (Smismans 2008), are important aspects to consider. 
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